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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

12695

GERALD FAY TUGGLE,

Defendant-Appell.ant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Gerald Fay Tuggle appeals from judgment and conviction entered against him in a jury trial before the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F.
V/ahlquist, Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of transferring stolen
property in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah, and
was sentenced according to law to imprisonment in the
Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this Court to affirm the conviction of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as stated
by appellant with the following clarifications:
Appellant had obtained title and had registered the
stolen Dodge Dart by using the serial number from an
automobile which was under a dismantling permit in the
wrecking yard (T. 107, Exhibit K).
The appellant defaulted in his financing contract with
Peoples Finance (T. 198). Wilber Moyer, Assistant Vicepresident of Peoples Finance picked up appellant's car.
After appellant came into Mr. Moyer's office, they took
the stolen automobile to Cutrubus Motors to negotiate
a trade (T. 198). Mr. Moyer drove the automobile down
to Cutrubus i'. 1otors and appellant met him there (T.
199). Mr. Moyer had asked Cutrubus to trade in appellant's car so Peoples Finance could get the equity from
the loan (T. 78-79). On the 16th day of December the
a!)pellnrct execut'..xl an agreement with Cutrubus to purch2,::-e Z't 19G2 Ford pid:.up and to use the stolen Dodge us
a trade-in (Exhibit N). The appellant's contract 'vith
Peoples was paid off, and a balance of $275.00 was remaining on the new contract with Cutrubus.
Appellant later made voluntary admissions against
his interest to John R. McKnight, a speciaJ agent for the

3
F.B.I. (T. 159). Appellant admitted to the transfer of
possession and that he had always known that the car
was stolen (T. 127, 186-187).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE STATE DID
MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S TRANSFER OF
POSSESSION TO CUTRUBUS MOTORS.
The appellant defaulted on his financing contract
with Peoples Finance Company (T. 198). Wilbur Moyer,
Assistant Vice-president of Peoples Finance picked up
appellant's car and kept the car at his home until appellant came down to Mr. Moyer's office. Then, with appellant's approval, Mr. Moyer delivered appellant's car to
Cutrubus Motors in order that appellant might trade his
'69 Dodge for a '62 Ford pickup (T. 198). Appellant met
Mr. Moyer at Cutrubus Motors and there negotiated the
trade (T. 199). Mr. Moyer had previously asked Phidia
Cutrubus if he would help appellant trade his car (T. 7879). The record clearly indicates that Peoples had no
l\Jason to believe otherwise than that the automobile belonged to appellant and that Mr. Moyer did nothing without the consent ;:i_nd cooperation of appellant. Mr. Moyer
believed he was helping appellant so that Peoples Finance
could get its equity out of the automobile. The actual
trade was made by appellant (T. 79). The transaction
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was strictly between Mr. Cutrubus and appellant (T. 80,
84, 200).
Appellant voluntarily made admissions against his
interest to William T. Rice, a special agent for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (T. 159). Appellant stated that
it was definitely he who traded his vehicle to Cutrubus
(T. 127, 134, 172). Appellant admitted that he knew the
vehicle was stolen (T. 187, 172).
In Kraisinger v. C. 0. Mammel Food Stores, 203 Kan.
973, 457 P. 2d 678 (1969), the court held that admissions
against interest are the strongest kind of evidence and
override other factors. The Supreme Court of Washington
in Williams v. Joslin, 399 P. 2d 308 (1965), held that a
failure to deny an admission after an opportunity to do so
is convincing proof of the facts admitted. This court in In
Re Miller's Estate, 31 Utah 415, 88 P. 338 (1906), held
that admissions against interest come in as substantive
evidence bearing upon a fact in issue.
There was ample evidence to support the jury's finding concerning a transfer of possession notwithstanding
appellant's admissions against interest.
Transfer of possession does not reqnire livery of
seisin-type transfer. Appellant's possession was transferred to Cutrubus. Although appellant did not literally
drive the 1969 Dodge to Cutmbus Motors, he was in command of the situation. His conduct was primarily responsible for the actual trans£ of possession to Cutrubus
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Motors. Appellant's intentions and conduct controlled
the transfer.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-401 (1953) states that transfer of possession does not take place until there is identification to the contract, completion of agreed conditions,
and completion of performance of physical delivery. Without appellant, Mr. Moyer could not have transferred
possession of appellant's automobile. Appellant incorrectly contends that the transfer was completed by physical delivery only, and that it was complete even before
there was an agreement or a contract. Wheeler v. United
States, 382 F. 2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967), held that possession of stolen property was a jury question. See also
Barnes v. United States, 341 F. 2d 189 (5th Cir. 1965).
The instructions to the jury in the present case were as
follows:
"By 'transfer possession' the court means that
the defendant transferred physical possession with
an intent that he would not receive the car back
and that any possessory rights he had were to be
transferred to Cutrubus Motor Company, it would
make no difference whether or not Cutrubus Motor Company was innocent or criminal in the matter. The words 'transfer possession' requires an
intent by the person making the transfer that the
appearance of legal title, or fale[sic] title, accompany the physical transfer transaction. Transfer
may be in person or in cooperation with others"
(R. 34). (Emphasis added.)
The jury found that appellant did transfer possession of
a stolen vehicle.
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Because the evidence did support the verdict, the
present case may be distinguished from State v. Adamson,
101 Utah 534, 125 P. 2d 429 (1942), as cited by appellant.
Adamson was involved in an automobile accident as a
result of which defendant was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter. The defendant made a left hand turn in
which he struck a boy traveling on a bicycle. The accident
occurred at night, and neither the boy nor the bicycle
were lighted. The defendant was traveling at a slow speed,
and there was absolutely no evidence to show that defendant drove recklessly, negligently or without reasonable care. The defendant was driving lawfully, while the
deceased boy was unlawfully on the highway without
lights. The case was dismissed because there was no evidence of recklessness or a willful or wanton disregard of
the rights and safety of others.
In the present case, however, the jury was presented
with sufficient evidence to support their findings of trans£e:r of possession.
Courts will not invade the province of the jury. In
State v. Whitely, 100 U. 14, 110 P. 2d 337 (1941), this
Court expressed its views regarding the proper respect
to be accorded the jury function. It said:
"The findings of fact made
court sitting as a jury, when
tial evidence, are final and
on appeal."
See also People v. Reichenan, 173

by a jury or the tri::Jl
supported by snb Lan
will not be disturbed
0

Cal. App. 2d 584, 343

7

P. 2d 603 (1959) and Bayne v. State, 72 Okl. Cr. 52, 112
P. 2d 1113 (1941).
In the instant case, the jury found sufficient facts
to satisfy each of the elements of the crime, and upon
those conclusions the appellant was convicted.
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957),
in which certioraii was denied, this court held:
"Before a verdict may properly be set aside, it
must appear that evidence was so inconclusive or
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly
upon it must have entertained reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the crime, and unless
evidence compels such conclusion as matter of law,
verdict must stand."
See also State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865
(1959); State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 183
(1960); and State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 442 P. 2d
196 (1967).
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERVENED TO PREVENT AN UNNECESSARY
WASTE OF TIME, AND REMEDY OBSCURITIES BY EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION
IN MATTERS OF EXAMINING WITNESSES AND CONDUCTING THE TRIAL.
It is often necessary for the judge to interfere in the
proceedings of the trial. The Canons of Judicial Ethics
of the American Bar Association, Canon 15 ( 1937) , provide:
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"A judge may properly intervene in a trial
of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity ... Conversation between the judge and
counsel in court is often necessary. ..." (Emphasis added.)
The court was understandably concerned about its time
schedule. Many of the court's comments were made t.o
prevent an unnecessary waste of time.
On page 5 of the transcript, the court did not announce to the jury that it was the prosecution's first jury
trial; the court merely asked the prosecution if this jury
trial were his first. The question was not prejudicial, but
it did help the judge in preparing for the trial. Later in
the trial, the judge made certain that this information
was preserved in the record so that a reviewing court
might understand the circumstances of the trial (T. 130).
Because of his inexperience, it was difficult for the
prosecuting attorney to phrase questions which were not
objectionable. The parties often Imew the question the
prosecuting attorney was attempting to ask and that the
question would be allowable if properly asked. After repeated obje8tions frcm the defense, the court was forc£d
to intervene to prevent stagnation of the proceedings.
The court intervened at those times in a manner which
was not prejudicial.
At one stage in the trial, the state made a motion
for a continuance (T. 48). To make a proper ruling on
the State's motion, it was necessary for the court to obtain
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information from the State's witness. The court dismissed
the jury while he questioned the witness so as not 1;o
prejudice either party (T. 46-55).
The Court's questioning of the witnesses were for
purposes of eliciting the truth. People v. Harris, 198 P.
2d 60 (Cal. App. 1948), recognizes the important position
of the judge under such circumstances:
" . . . The law does not require the judge 1;o
maintain a sphinx-like attitude and merely 1;o announce his decision upon mooted points. On the
contrary, he must see 1;o it that no factual issue
is left in a fog when by proper statement or :inquiry the testimony might be made clear. His plimary duty is 1;o see that justice is administered,
and this cannot under all circumstances be done
by silence and inaction in the presence of a controversy." Id. at 65.
The judge informed the defense that he questioned the
state's witness in order to maintain fairness (T. 129-130).
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Brown,
197 P. 2d 590 (1948), held that a court's remarks which
give reasons for his ruling, or which ask clarifying questions is within the discretion of the court. See also United
States v. Bayside Novelty Co., 275 F. 2d 207 (2d Cir.
1960), wherein it was held that there was no :impropriety
in a trial judge asking numerous questions. Certiorari
was denied in 364 U. S. 843, 81 S. Ct. 82.
An unusually large number of questions will not constitute reversible error. United States v. Lewis, 338 F. 2d
137 (6th Cir. 1964), held that for a trial judge to ask over
1100 questions did not constitute reversible error.
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A strong similarity between Lewis, and the present
case is that the instructions to the jury were substantially
identical. In the present case, the jury instructions were
as follows:
"If during this trial the court has said or done
anything which has suggested to you that it is
inclined to favor the claim or position of either
party, you will not permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.

"The court has not intended to indicate any
opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not,
worthy of belief, nor which party should prevail.
If any expression has seemed to indicate an opinion relative to any of these matters, you should
disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges
of the facts" (R. 42).
This court in State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P. 2d
222 (1935), stated that a trial judge, within reasonable
bounds, may ask questions of witnesses for purposes of
eliciting truth or clarifying any point otherwise obsecure.
See also State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750 (1936);
Ayash v. United States, 352 F. 2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1965);
People v. Corrigan, 310 P. 2d 953 (1957); and Henderson
v. State, 385 P. 2d 930 (Okla. Crim. 1963).
In the instant case, the judge did not state biased
views in his qu22tions or conduct. To further remove any
doubt or inclination which the jury might have had regarding his position, the court issued jury instmction
number 14.
In U. S. v. Carengella, 198 F. 2d 3 (9th Cir. 1952),
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the case cited in appellant's brief, the court affirmed
Carengella's conviction. While it was determined that the
lower court was in error, the error was held not to be substantial. The court stated: "We must consider it as harmless error."
If in the instant case, as in Carengella, the court be
found in error, the court's misuse of discretion was nothing more than harmless error.

POINT III.
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE TO ESTABLISH
CLAIM OF TITLE WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT.
State's Exhibit J, a copy of the original application
for title of a 1969 Dodge owned by Fonzo D. Black, was
properly admitted into evidence. The application for title
had various stamps placed upon it by the Motor Vehicle
Department which showed the title to have been canceled,
and that the vehicle had been junked (T. 59-60).
Mr. Berry, the custodian of the records, reproduced
Exhibit J from a microfilm viewer and print which is kept
on record in the Motor Vehicle Department (T. 55-57).
Mr. Berry certified that the photostat copy was a true
and correct copy of the document on file with the State
Tax Commission (Exhibit J). Mr. Berry further testified
that it was he who removed the document from the State
Tax Commission files and photostated Exhibit J. The

Supreme Court of Nevada in Havos v. Casino Corp., 417
P. 2d 239 (1966), held, concerning a certificate of ownership and registration from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles:
"Foundation for admission of the exhibit complied with the statute in that it was certified by
the public officer having its custody as being a
true, full and correct copy of the original. . . . Furthermore, the exhibit on its face was relevant from
a reading thereof, thus no further offer of proof
was necessary.... " Id. at 242.
According to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Exhibit J was properly authenticated.
The court ruled that Exhibit J was admissible under Rule 72. Rule 72 states the following:
"The content of any admissible writing made in
the regular course of 'a business' as defined by
Rule 62 or in the regular course of duty of any
'public official' as defined by said Rule, may be
proved by a photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic, or other process which accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for
so reproducing the original or enlargement thereof,
when duly authenticated, if it was in the regular
course of such business or official activity to make
and preserve such copies or reproductions as a
part of the records of such business or office ... "
Although Exhibit J was difficult to read, 1fr. Berry
was able to state to the jury the complete contents of the
document (T. 56, 59-60). The issue of accuracy of reproduction was for the court to decide, and appellant's objection to the court's ruling is not substantial. A Cali-
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fornia court properly admitted int.o evidence the tape recordings of conversations of one of the defendants over
the objections that there was insufficient proof of their
authenticity and that they were mainly unintelligible.
People v. Rosoto, 23 Cal. Rptr. 779, 373 P. 2d 867 (1962).
While attempting t.o get a clear and accurate reprint,
Mr. Berry took at least 6 copies of the microfilm (T. 58).
Because Exhibit J was not 100% legible, the court informed appellant that he could subpoena the clearly legible microfilm if there happened t.o be any questions regarding the information described in the document by
Mr. Berry (T. 59). At a later date in the trial, Mr. Berry
brought to the court the original microfilm from which
Exhibit J was made, t.ogether with a more legible copy of
the document (T. 190-191). To establish that Exhibit J
did in fact contain the material to which Mr. Berry had
testified, the jury was given access t.o the microfilm (T.
191).
The regular course of business and official activities
of the State Tax Commission of Utah involve the microfilming of copies of documents such as Exhibit J before
they are destroyed. The microfilm was an admissible
writing, and Rule 72 allows photographic copies of such
records to be admitted into evidence so long as they are
properly authenticated. Utah Rule 72 has been adopted
word for word from the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1953). The "Comment" found at the bottom of Rule
72 of the Unifonn Rules of Evidence sets forth the authentication requirement of Rule 72:
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". . . Authentication of photographic copies would
be in the same manner as authentication of any
other writing depending on its nature. For instance, a photographic copy of a business record
could be proved by any evidence which would
establish its authenticity or the photographic copy
of an official record could be proved by proper
attestation and certification as required by Rule
68."
Rule 68 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is slightly
different from Utah Rule 68. According to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, the following would be proper authentication:
" . . or (b) evidence has been introduced sufficient to warrant a finding that the writing is a
correct copy of the record or entry; ... "
There should be no question as to the authentication
of Exhibit J. Mr. Berry, the custodian of the records,
testified as to its authenticity. He had personally made
the photostat which was Exhibit J. He then made the
original microfilm available for the court's inspection. It
would be difficult to present stronger evidence authenticating Exhibit J than that which the State had already
presented. The State did more than to merely have the
custodian's certification upon the Exhibit; the State
brought the custodian into the courtroom and authenticated the document by personal verification and testimony.
Appellant contends that Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, & I, should not have been received into evidence be-
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cause of an improper foundation which could not meet
the authentication requirements provided for in Rule 66A,
Rule 68, Rule 70, and Rule 72. Appellant is mistaken
since Rule 66A has never been adopted by the Supreme
Court of Utah. See Rules of Evidence, Ut. Sup. Crt. eff.
July 1, 1971.
The exhibits objected to by appellant were removed
from the files by Phillip Proctor, the Assistant Director
of the Motor Vehicle Department, and taken to the preliminary hearing. After the preliminary hearing, the documents remained in the evidence room (T. 42}. Mr.
Proctor was on vacation in Connecticut during the trial
and would not return for one month (T. 46). Edward S.
Berry, the custodian of the records for the Motor Vehicle
Department came to the trial to authenticate the records
in place of Mr. Proctor (T. 46). Mr. Berry's duties at
the Motor Vehicle Department are similar to Mr. Proctor's duties (T. 42). Mr. Berry testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Berry, what do you know, or what
knowledge do you have about the document here
in question?

A. I know that Mr. Proctor brought the documents to Court on a subpo2na and that he did, in
fact, remove them from the file and prepared certified copies.
THE COURT: You mean he put the copies
in the file or took the copies with him?
A. No, our standard procedure, Your Honor,
is, when we present documents to the court that
we also bring certified capies.
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THE COURT: Would you know these documents if you saw them?
A.

Yes, I would (T. 42-43).

Mr. Berry further testified as to what the stamp markings on the documents represented, and that the only way
the stamp markings could be on the documents was for
the documents to have been on file with the Department
(T. 45-47). While Mr. Berry was certain as to the authenticity of the documents, he did not personally see the documents removed from the file (T. 45). As a consequence,
the court refused to allow the documents into evidence
until they could be given stronger identification, or until
the state could find someone who had actually seen the
documents on file in the Motor Veltlcle Department (T.
46, 47, 55).
The S'tate moved for a continuance, until Mr. Proctor
could return to testify (T. 48). The court denied the
State's continuance because there appeared to be enough
evidence to convict the defendant and the documents in
question would only be cumulative evidence (T. 54).
At that stage of the trial in which the State's continuance was denied, the court did not know whether any
of the State's witnesses had ever seen the documents on
file. The court stated that Mr. Berry could not sufficiently 8.uthenticate the documents; that Mr. Berry could
only testify to what he had personally seen in the file or
taken from the file (T. 53). Later during the trial, Mr.
an investigator for the Motor Vehicle Business Administration, testified that he obseived the docu-
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ments in question in the files of the Motor Vehicle Department. He had thoroughly examined the documents
while in the course of the investigation of said vehicles.
His testimony duly authenticated the documenra, and
they were then received into evidence (T. 100-103).

I

I
1

Appellant's brief quotes the court's language on page
101 of the transcript and suggests that the court passed
to the jury the question of reception of the documents
into evidence. Such was not so. The court clearly st.ated:
"I received them into evidence" (T. 101). (Emphasis
added.) Having received the documents into evidence,
the Court was merely instructing that it was not mandatory for the jury to place unwaivering credence upon the
data recited in the documents, but that the evidence
should be given whatever weight to which they felt it was
entitled. Such was an accurate st.atement of the law. See
30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1124 (1967).
Rule 70 would be inapplicable to sust.ain appellant's
objections because of the exceptions under Rule 70 (1)
(a), (b), & (e). Utah Rule 70 is adopted from the Uni£01m Rules of Evidence. The comment from Rule 70 of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence states the following:
"The 'Best Evidence Rule' at common law as
well as here is a preferential rather than an exclusionary rule. Ira object is to prevent a litigant from
depriving the trier of fact, by. fraudulent design,
of the benefit of the only certain proof of the content of a writing, the writing iraelf. As to public
records and recorded originals proof by duly authenticated copies of the record as elsewhere pro-
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vided in these rules, serves the purpose nearly as
well. No distinction is made between grades of
secondary evidence, and purported copies of ordinary writings are treated as secondary and not
preferential in the same sense as any other type of
evidence of content." Id. (Emphasis added.)
Rule 72 allows photo copies of public records to be
accepted as evidence if "duly authenticated". Rule 67
explains how a document is duly authenticated:
"Authentication may be by evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of its authenticity or by any
other means provided by law."
Rule 67 then goes on to verify its liberal application by
stating that if a document merely meets the "Ancient
Documents" requirements, it is sufficiently authenticated.
Rule 68 gives the certification requirement which may be
used to. establish authentication. The critical word in the
rule is "may" be used to authenticate public documents.
It does not say that Rule 68 must be used, or that authentication of public records is limited to Rule 68. This indicates that other appropriate means of authentication
may establish grounds for admissibility. This authentication requirement is substantiated by other sources. State
v. Salazar, 3 Ariz. App. 114, 412 P. 2d 289 (1966), held
that the rule relating to admission of official records is
permissible and not exclusive of other methods of authentication. See also 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 963 (1967);
and 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 996 (1967).
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v.
Sedillo, 82 N. !\1. 287, 480 P. 2d 401 (1971), declared that
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the copy of a radio log was sufficiently authenticated by
testimony even though there was no attempt to have the
copy certified as an official record. See also Kellerher v.
Porter, 189 P. 2d 223 (1948).
In another New Mexico decision, State v. Miller, 79
N. M. 117, 440 P. 2d 792 (1968), the court held that if
the writing purports to be an official record and is proved
to have come from the proper public office, the writing
is sufficiently authenticated to be admissible.
The trial judge's determination of authentication is
discretionary and must be accorded some latitude of
judgment. McCormick on Evidence, §§ 194, 191 (1954).
The trial court properly admitted the Exhibits into
evidence. This court in State v. Davie, 121 Utah 189, 240
P. 2d 265 (1952), explained how proper foundations are
determined:

"It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine when such foundation is laid and sufficient
showing of the credibility of the evidence is established." Id. at 191.
See also Carpenter Paper Company v. Brannock, 14 Utah
2d 34, 376 P. 2d 939 (1962). In Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah
2d 195, 4S8 P. 2d 369 (1970), this Court said that when
a trial court has a statutory alternative based on discretion, there is a presumption that the trial court's conclusion is clothed with propriety and bona fides, which presumption is destmyable only by clear evidence adduced
by him who attacks it. See also Citizens Gas Co. of New
York v.
17 Utah 2d 304, 410 P. 2d 767 (1966).
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There was an adequate foundation from which the
judge could determine the reliability of the Exhibits.
There had been personal testimony that the documents
were on file in the Motor Vehicle Department. The documents bore particular stamps which could only have been
placed there if the documents had in fact been on file
(T. 45). Testimony as to their origin and means of arriving at the courtroom did substantiate the fact that they
were authentic.
In In Re Richard's Estate v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 106,
297 P. 2d 542 ( 1956) , this court recognized an additional
reason why the documents should be regarded as trustworthy and should be relied upon. It is because Utah has
very strict statutes which make it a felony to alter or
falsify such documents. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-1-5,
41-1-122, 41-1-58 (1953).
Records made by governmental agencies are business
records within the meaning of Federal and State Business
Records Acts. Kemp v. Pinal County, 8 Ariz. App. 41,
442 P. 2d 864 (1968).
The business entries exception to the hearsay rule,
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (13) (1971), allows records to be offered into evidence which are regular and
trustworthy. The note at the bottom of Rule 63 (13)
states: "It leaves to the judge whether the sources of
information and method and time of preparation reflects
trustworthiness.''
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In Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., et
al., 122 Utah 268, 248 P. 2d 268 (1952),, this court held
that a man who had no association with the bank until
after the transaction took place could testify simply because he was familiar with the records of the bank which
were made concurrent with the transaction and he was
competent to identify them and their contents. Davie,
supra, held that if a witness cannot be obtained, other
employees who are familiar with the facts may so testify.
Id. at 190-191. See also Colburn v. Parrett, 27 Cal. App.
541, 150 P. 786 (1915) and Chandler v. Hibberd, 332 P.
2d 133 (1958).

When the State, having the burden of proof, establishes a prima facie case, it will prevail, in the absence of
proof to the contrary offered on the part of the appellant.
Since the appellant did not avoid the affect of such prima
facie case by producing evidence to meet it, the judgment
of the lower court should be affirmed.
Even had the lower court committed error in admitting the Exhibits which appellant's brief objects to,
it could amount to nothing more than harmless error. The
appellant had made an admission against his interest (T.
1D9) . Admissions made by a party are the strongest kind
of evidence. Hiniger v. Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P. 2d 305
(1965). Even supposing that there had been no admission against interest, there was still clearly enough testimony £..nd evidence to convict appellant.
The general rule is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §
77-42-1 (1953):
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"After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If
error has been committed, it shall not be presumed
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be
satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment."
Erroneous admission of evidence does not call for
reversal of the judgment where the guilt of the accused
is otherwise satisfactorily proved, State v. Cox, 74 Utah
149, 277 P. 972 (1929). It must be shown that the natural
effect of the error is to do harm and affect the substantial
rights of the parties. State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365
P. 2d 798 (1961).
The primary purpose of all rules of procedure is to
secure for the people and for the defendant a reasonably
fair trial, in which all relevant truth is made known to the
trier of fact; and no case should be reversed unless it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appealing party would have been reached in absence of error.
Pacific Digest, Criminal Law, Key 1162; People v. Wardwell, 167 C. A. 2d 560, 334 P. 2d 641 (1959).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, the appellant's guilt was
properly determined. The evidence presented by the
state provided adequate proof in support of the jury's
verdict; The documentary evidence offered by the state
was properly received, though it was only additional evidence and not absolutely necessary to establish appellant's guilt. Because the court's proper use of discretion
will not constitute grounds for a reversal, respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the lower court
be affirmed.
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